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Abstract
We show that under plausible levels of background risk, no theory of choice under
risk—such as expected utility theory, prospect theory, or rank dependent utility—can
simultaneously satisfy the following three economic postulates: (i) Decision makers are
risk-averse over small gambles, (ii) they respect stochastic dominance, and (iii) they
account for background risk.
1 Introduction
How humans evaluate the trade-off between risks and rewards is one of the core questions in
economics. In solving this trade-off many people exhibit small-stakes risk aversion: small,
actuarially favorable gambles—such as a lottery where one loses $10 or wins $11 with equal
probability—are often rejected.1
In this paper we study how background risk (stemming, for instance, from investments in
the stock market or health conditions) affects risk attitudes towards small gambles. We argue
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Paul Heidhues, Matthew Rabin, Todd Sarver, Charlie Sprenger and Juuso Välimäki for helpful comments
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1See, e.g., Hey and Orme (1994), and the survey by Harrison and Rutström (2008) for evidence of risk-
averse behavior.
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Gamble StDeviation of Background Risk: σ
Gain/Loss Laplace Logistic Normal*
$11/$10 σ ≥ $156 σ ≥ $200 σ ≥ $3319
$55/$50 σ ≥ $779 σ ≥ $999 σ ≥ $7422
$110/$100 σ ≥ $1557 σ ≥ $1997 σ ≥ $10,498
$550/$500 σ ≥ $7785 σ ≥ $9984 σ ≥ $23,526
$1100/$1000 σ ≥ $15,569 σ ≥ $19,967 σ ≥ $33,361
Table 1: Standard deviation of background risk sufficient for every decision
maker with monotone preferences to accept various fifty-fifty gambles under
different distributional assumptions on the background risk. The numbers
displayed are bounds derived from our Theorem 1 and Corollary 2. *The
normal distribution has mean $100,000, and the decision maker’s wealth is
bounded below by $0, according to a limited liability assumption which we
discuss in §2.
that for plausible levels of background risk, no theory of preferences can explain small-stakes
risk aversion without violating monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
For example, we show that the aforementioned gamble must be accepted by any decision
maker with monotone preferences, provided that they face an independent background risk
with exponential tails and standard deviation as small as $200. This insight is not specific
to this particular example. Our main result, Theorem 1, establishes that for every bounded
gamble with strictly positive mean there exists a level of background risk such that accepting
the gamble is dominant with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. We furthermore
provide a simple bound on how large the background risk needs to be for this conclusion to
hold for a given gamble. This bound implies that under plausible levels of background risk
it is stochastically dominant to accept many gambles that are frequently rejected.
To illustrate the result, consider a decision maker who is facing a binary gamble X under
which she gains G dollars or loses L dollars with probability 1/2. If the gamble was taken
in isolation, then the choice of whether or not to accept it would depend on her preferences
between X and a sure outcome of 0. But if the decision maker is facing an independent
background risk W regarding her wealth, then the relevant choice is between W , if the
gamble is rejected, and W +X , if the gamble is accepted. Table 1 displays different levels
of standard deviations and distributional assumptions for the background risk under which
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Gamble StDeviation of Background Risk: σ
Gain/Loss Laplace Logistic Normal
$11/$10 σ ≥ $62 σ ≥ $46 σ ≥ $44
$55/$50 σ ≥ $306 σ ≥ $230 σ ≥ $217
$110/$100 σ ≥ $612 σ ≥ $460 σ ≥ $434
$550/$500 σ ≥ $3058 σ ≥ $2299 σ ≥ $2169
$1000/$1100 σ ≥ $6115 σ ≥ $4598 σ ≥ $4338
Table 2: Standard deviation of background risk sufficient for a CPT
decision maker to accept various fifty-fifty gambles under different distri-
butional assumptions on the background risk. The specific CPT prefer-
ence considered here has gain/loss probability weighting functions w+(p) =
pγ
(pγ+(1−p)γ )1/γ , w
−(p) = p
δ
(pδ+(1−p)δ)1/δ with γ = 0.61, δ = 0.69, loss aver-
sion parameter λ = 2.25 and value function v(x) = x0.88 for x ≥ 0 and
v(x) = −λ(−x)0.88 for x < 0. These parameter values are taken from
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, pages 309–312).
W + X dominates W in first-order stochastic dominance. For example, in the case of the
fifty-fifty gamble with gain G = 11 and loss L = 10, it is dominant to accept whenever the
decision maker’s wealth has a standard deviation higher than $200 and is either Laplace or
Logistically distributed.
The standard deviation of many real-life risks plausibly exceeds this threshold by a large
margin. For example, an investor who has $100,000 in an S&P 500 index fund reasonably
faces a wealth risk with standard deviation $1,000 (or 1%) for the value of her portfolio at
the end of each day, and $15,000 at the end of the year.2 Nevertheless, small-stakes gambles
are commonly rejected. Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) find that among clients of a
U.S. bank with median wealth exceeding $10 million, the rejection rate of a hypothetical
$550/$500 gamble is 71%. Table 1 suggests that this behavior is inconsistent with these
investors taking into account even the short-term background risk they face.
Table 1 applies to all monotone preferences. For particular preference specifications, the
required background risk levels become smaller. Table 2 displays the same results for the Cu-
mulative Prospect Theory preferences as proposed and calibrated by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992). The levels of background risk that will lead a decision maker with such preferences to
2See, e.g., Bardgett, Gourier, and Leippold (2019).
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accept various small gambles are significantly smaller than the levels for general preferences
displayed in Table 1.3
Our analysis shows a tension between three natural requirements for any theory of choice
under risk: (i) risk aversion over small gambles, (ii) monotonicity with respect to first-order
stochastic dominance, and (iii) choices are made accounting for background risk. As (i)
is commonly observed in real world choices, and relaxing (ii) is widely considered unap-
pealing, our results suggest that theories that do not account for narrow framing—whereby
independent sources of risk are evaluated separately by the decision maker—cannot explain
commonly observed choices among risky alternatives.
Related Literature. Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964) show that under expected utility
and a twice-differentiable utility function, a decision maker accepts any actuarially favorable
gamble, provided that it is scaled to be small enough. Our results imply that under heavy-
tailed background risk, there is a scale such that all expected utility decision makers will
accept the gamble.
As argued by Rabin (2000), the degree of concavity necessary for a utility function
to explain small-stakes risk aversion leads to implausible choices when stakes are large.
For example, given any risk-averse expected utility preference, if a gamble where one loses
$100 or wins $110 with equal probability is rejected at all wealth levels below $300,000,
then a gamble where one loses $2000 and wins $12,000,000 with equal probability must
also be rejected at wealth levels below $290,000. Ang, Bekaert, and Liu (2005) show that
this shortcoming of expected utility may be addressed by alternative preference theories
that feature first-order risk aversion (Segal and Spivak, 1990), such as loss aversion, rank-
dependent utility or disappointment aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Quiggin, 1982;
Gul, 1991).4 Nonetheless, Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) highlight that in standard
dynamic models of recursive preferences, background risk can smooth out first-order risk
aversion. They show that in the presence of large background risk, Rabin’s critique extends
to preferences that admit a recursive representation and exhibit disappointment aversion.
Safra and Segal (2008) also study background risk, and generalize the finding of Rabin
(2000) to non-expected utility preferences that admit a Gâteaux differentiable functional
3Similar considerations apply to other classes of preferencess: for example a similar effect of background
risk on the willingness to accept (relatively) small gambles is shown for reference dependent utility in Table
1 and Proposition 6 in Kőszegi and Rabin (2007).
4In the context of stochastic choice, Khaw, Li, and Woodford (2020) provide a new model of first-order
risk aversion based on cognitively imprecise representation of the decision environment.
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representation. More recently, Sarver (2018) proposes a new class of dynamic mixture-averse
preferences that can reconcile risk attitudes toward both small and large gambles, provided
the amount of background risk is moderate. Gollier (2004) surveys the earlier literature on
background risk within expected utility.
Our results differ from this previous literature along two dimensions: First, while earlier
work has focused on specific classes of preferences, we allow for arbitrary monotone prefer-
ences over lotteries. Thus, our results imply that a critique in the spirit of Rabin (2000)
applies not only to expected utility, but to any class of monotone preferences. In addition, the
previous literature has typically argued that small-stakes risk aversion implies implausible
rejection of large gambles with substantially positive expected values. In contrast, we argue
that in the presence of plausible background risk, and without narrow framing, small-stakes
risk aversion implies that the decision maker sometimes prefers less wealth over more.
The analysis of this paper emphasizes the importance of narrow framing for theories of
choice under risk. The idea that narrow framing affects decision makers’ risk attitudes goes
back to Benartzi and Thaler (1995), who propose an explanation of the equity premium
puzzle via loss aversion and narrow framing.5 Later work by Gneezy and Potters (1997) and
Thaler et al. (1997) experimentally test the hypothesis that decision makers who account for
more background risk tend to be more tolerant of independent risky gambles. To the best of
our knowledge, our paper is the first to demonstrate theoretically that whenever a plausible
level of background risk is taken into consideration, minimal assumptions on preferences
lead to risk-neutral behavior for small gambles. Interestingly, the connection between narrow
framing and stochastically dominant choices is also explored in Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009),
who shows that any decision maker who engages in narrow framing and has non-CARA
preferences will make choices that, when combined, violate stochastic dominance.
Tarsney (2018) and Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz (2020) independently show that back-
ground risk can induce stochastic dominance between gambles that are not already ranked.
In particular, Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz (2020) prove that if X and Y are random vari-
ables with E [X ] > E [Y ], then there exists an independent random variable Z such that
X + Z first-order stochastically dominates Y + Z. In their result, the random variable Z
is tailored to the particular X and Y involved. In contrast, in this paper we show that all
sufficiently large heavy-tailed background risks ensure stochastic dominance, and explicitly
characterize the necessary size of the background risk. The resulting background risks in
5As mentioned, Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) also emphasize the role of narrow framing for ratio-
nalizing risk attitudes toward small and large gambles. A similar theme appears in Rabin and Thaler (2001),
Cox and Sadiraj (2006), and Rubinstein (2006).
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this paper are smaller by an order of magnitude (as measured by standard deviation) than
in previous work.
2 Model
A decision maker faces a choice between accepting or rejecting a gamble described by a
bounded random variable X that takes negative values with positive probability. We thus
rule out the trivial case where X ≥ 0 almost surely. The decision maker’s wealth W is
random and independent of X , and accepting the gamble leads to final wealth W +X . We
interpret W as background risk the decision maker faces when considering whether or not to
accept the gamble. We assume W is distributed according to a density g : R → R+ that has
full support, is eventually decreasing, and is piece-wise continuously differentiable.6 This is
a weak technical assumption that holds for many common distributions, like the Normal,
Logistic, or Laplace distributions.
Monotone Preferences. WhenW+X dominates W with respect to first-order stochastic
dominance, we say that accepting X is dominant. We make no assumptions on the decision
maker’s behavior except that she accepts every dominant gamble.
Recall that a random variable Y first-order stochastically dominates another random
variable Z if for every a ∈ R it holds that P [Y ≥ a] ≥ P [Z ≥ a]. The condition admits an
intuitive reformulation. As is well known, it is equivalent to the existence of two random
variables Ỹ , Z̃ with the same distributions as Y and Z, respectively, and such that Ỹ ≥
Z̃ almost surely. The assumption that behavior is consistent with first-order stochastic
dominance therefore expresses the idea that the decision maker’s choice depends only on the
distributions of W +X and W , and that more money is preferred over less.
As discussed in the introduction, consistency with respect to stochastic dominance is a
weak assumption satisfied by virtually all preference specifications studied in decision theory
and behavioral economics. In fact, the assumption can be satisfied even when behavior is
not described by means of a single preference relation over wealth distributions, as in models
of random expected utility.
6Formally, g is continuous, and there exists a positive integer n and numbers −∞ = a0 < a1 < · · · <
an−1 < an = ∞ such that g is continuously differentiable on each of the open intervals (ai−1, ai). Moreover,
we require for each i, the limits limxրai g
′(x) and limxցai g
′(x) exist and are finite. Using the continuity of
g and the Mean Value Theorem, it can be shown that these limits are the left and right derivatives of g at
ai, respectively.
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Limited Liability. In many contexts it is natural to assume that the decision maker is
protected by limited liability, in the sense that her wealth cannot go below a bound ℓ ∈ R.
Given a random variable Z, we denote by (Z)ℓ = max{Z, ℓ} the variable truncated at ℓ.
Under limited liability, comparison between risky prospects boils down to a comparison
between their truncated counterparts: The decision maker receives the amount (W + X)ℓ
when she accepts the gamble, and Wℓ when she rejects it. Accordingly, we say that accepting
X is dominant if (W +X)ℓ dominates (W )ℓ in first-order stochastic dominance. Thus, we
assume the decision maker prefers more wealth than less, and prefers a lower probability of
reaching the liability bound. Aside from this, we make no assumptions on what reaching the
bound implies for the decision maker.
3 Main Results
Before stating the formal results we introduce two indices for quantifying the magnitude of
the background risk and the riskiness of a gamble.
Size of the Background Risk Given a background risk W with density g, we define its









where the supremum is taken over points a where g is differentiable. We say that W is heavy
left-tailed if S(W ) > 0. This restriction excludes distributions with thin tails such as the
Normal distribution, but includes common parametric families such as Logistic or Laplace.7
Intuitively, the exponential size is a measure of how likely are large losses relative to
small ones. The larger S(W ), the more slowly the density g increases, and hence the thicker
is the left tail of the distribution. More formally, the density g(a) associated with a loss
a < 0 must lie above the exponential function g(0) · e
a
S(W ) and thus cannot vanish faster than
exponentially. Similar to the standard deviation, the exponential size is positive homoge-
neous and independent of the location of W (i.e. it satisfies S(tW ) = tS(W ) for t > 0 and
S(W ) = S(W + c) for any c ∈ R).8
7Any distribution can be approximated by one that satisfies this property. As we show in Proposition 4
in the Appendix, given any random variable Y and any ǫ > 0, the sum Y + ǫZ of Y and an independent
random variable Z that is heavy left-tailed will be heavy left-tailed as well.
8The exponential size is however not symmetric: in general S(−W ) 6= S(W ). This is reflective of the fact
that the exponential size mainly concerns the left tail of the background risk distribution.
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Riskiness of the Gamble We quantify the riskiness of a gamble in terms of the Aumann-
Serrano index. Given a gamble X with positive expectation and positive probability of being
negative, Aumann and Serrano (2008) define its riskiness R(X) as the reciprocal of the level
of absolute risk aversion at which a decision maker with CARA utility is indifferent between










Intuitively, a gamble that is assigned a higher index is riskier because it is accepted by a
smaller pool of risk-averse CARA decision makers.
Aumann and Serrano (2008) provide an axiomatic foundation for the index. The riskiness
index can also be related to simpler concepts such as the expectation of a gamble and the size
of its support. In particular, for a gamble X that is supported in an interval [−M,M ] and
has expectation ǫ > 0, its riskiness index satisfies R(X) ≤ M2
ǫ
, as we show in Proposition 3
in the Appendix.
The next theorem is the main technical result of the paper. It shows that it is dominant
to accept any gamble that has positive expectation and whose riskiness is bounded by the
exponential size of the background risk. The complete proof is provided in §4 below.
Theorem 1. Under any given background risk W , it is dominant to accept every gamble X
with positive expectation and riskiness R(X) ≤ S(W ).
This result implies that accepting a gamble X is dominant provided it is not excessively
risky compared to the size of the background riskW . An important corollary is the following:
Corollary 1. Suppose the background risk W is heavy left-tailed, i.e. S(W ) > 0, or the
decision maker is protected by limited liability for some liability bound ℓ. Then, for every
gamble X with positive expectation, accepting the scaled gamble tX is dominant for all t > 0
small enough.
In the case of limited liability, the next result—another corollary of Theorem 1—shows
that a large enough Normal background risk suffices to make any actuarially favorable gamble
dominant.
Corollary 2. Under a background risk distributed Normally with mean µ and standard
deviation σ, it is dominant for a decision maker with limited liability bound ℓ to accept every





As we show in the Appendix, similar lower bounds can be derived for other distributions,
and are especially simple to calculate for log-concave densities such as the Normal density.
Theorem 1 and its corollaries allow us to provide quantitative estimates for the level
of background risk under which accepting a gamble is dominant. To illustrate, consider
a gamble X that pays $110 and −$100 with equal probabilities and a background risk
W having Laplace distribution, i.e. following a density g(a) = 1
2λ
e−|a|/λ. The parameter
λ coincides with the exponential size of W , and the distribution has standard deviation
σ =
√
2λ. It follows from Theorem 1 that it is dominant to accept the gamble X as long as




where R(x) ≈ 1100.83 is the solution to the equation e−110/R(x) + e100/R(x) = 2. If instead









For a decision maker with limited liability bound ℓ = 0 and Normally distributed W with
mean $100,000, it is dominant to accept X if
σ ≥
√
R(X) · 100,110 ≈ $10,498.
Table 1 is constructed from similar calculations.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
Let s = S(W ), and let G denote the c.d.f. of W . The result is vacuous when s = 0, so we
focus below on s > 0. A gamble X has positive expectation and Aumann-Serrano index
R(X) ≤ s if and only if it is accepted by a decision maker with constant absolute risk









On the other hand, accepting the gamble X is dominant if
P [W +X ≤ a] ≤ P [W ≤ a] = G(a) for all a ∈ R .
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Since the gamble X and the background risk W are independent, we have that
P [W +X ≤ a] = P [W ≤ a−X ] = E [G(a−X)].
Thus, accepting X is dominant if and only if
E [G(a−X)] ≤ G(a) for all a ∈ R . (2)
Inequality (2) can be interpreted as saying that a decision maker with expected utility
preferences and utility function G rejects the gamble −X at every wealth level a. This
analogy is useful as it allows us to understand stochastic dominance through the behavior of
a hypothetical expected utility decision maker whose utility coincides with the distribution
G of the background risk. The preference defined by G is in general neither globally risk-
averse nor risk-loving. Since the expectation of −X is negative, equation (2) is equivalent
to imposing that the utility function G is “not too risk-loving.” Below we formalize this
intuition.
As shown by (1) and (2) above, to say that it is dominant to accept every gamble X with








≤ 1 =⇒ E [G(a−X)] ≤ G(a) for all a ∈ R. (3)
That is, any gamble −X that is rejected by a decision maker with (risk-loving) CARA utility
U(a) = e
a
s is also rejected by a decision maker with utility G, at all wealth levels. In other
terms, we require G to be globally more risk-averse than U in the sense of Arrow-Pratt.
To show this, let us first suppose for simplicity that the density g is everywhere differen-
tiable. In this case, since the exponential size of W is s, we have g′(a)/g(a) ≤ 1/s for every












for all a ∈ R .
It follows that G is indeed more risk-averse than U .
For the general case where g is only piece-wise continuously differentiable, note that
U(a) = e
a
s is a strictly increasing function, enabling us to write G(a) = φ (U(a)) = φ(e
a
s ) for
some increasing function φ defined on (0,∞). Our goal is to show that φ is concave, so that
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G is more risk-averse than U . Note that
g(a) = G′(a) = φ′(e
a





Thus φ is concave if and only if φ′ is a decreasing function, which in turn is equivalent to
g(a) · e− as being decreasing in a. Since g is piece-wise continuously differentiable, we know
that even if g is not differentiable at some point a, the left and right derivatives do exist, and
they also satisfy g′(a)/g(a) ≤ 1/s. From this it follows that g(a) · e−a/s is indeed decreasing,
concluding the proof of Theorem 1.
In fact, the above proof establishes a stronger statement: given any background risk W
and any number s ≥ 0, it is dominant to accept every gamble X with positive expectation
and riskiness R(X) ≤ s if and only if the background risk satisfies S(W ) ≥ s. In particular,
the bound R(X) ≤ S(W ) in Theorem 1 is cannot be improved.
To conclude this section we briefly comment on the case of general background risks that
need not have full support or admit a density. Note that (3) holds if and only if G(a) = φ(e
a
s )
for some concave function φ. Thus, for any s > 0, it is dominant to accept every gamble
X with E [X ] > 0 and R(X) ≤ s only if the background risk distribution G does admit a
density g, and g = G′ almost everywhere. Moreover, in order for φ to be concave, it must
hold that g(a) · e− as is decreasing in a. These conditions are both necessary and sufficient for
all such gambles X to be dominant. In particular, it is not necessary for the background risk
to be unbounded from above, or for it to have a differentiable or even continuous density.
5 Discussion
Limited Liability and Small-Stakes Risk Aversion. As shown by Corollary 1, our
main result holds under comparatively weaker assumptions in the case of limited liability,
where it is not necessary to impose assumptions on the tails of the background risk distri-
bution. This is intuitive, as details of the left tail of W are irrelevant for describing the
distributions of the truncated random variables (W )ℓ and (W +X)ℓ.
It is useful to compare this fact with a different phenomenon related to limited liability. It
is well known that a decision maker, even if risk-averse, can display a behavior that appears
to be risk-loving when protected by limited liability. Consider, for instance, an expected
utility preference with utility function u. Under limited liability, payoffs are truncated below
the cutoff ℓ. This in turn is equivalent to applying a convex transformation to u. It is
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then easy to construct examples where limited liability makes a gamble X that has negative
expectation acceptable despite u being globally concave. Thus, a natural question is whether
the conclusions of Corollary 1 are driven by a degree of risk-loving that is a by-product of
limited liability, rather than by the effect of background risk.
As we show in §B in the Appendix, limited liability does not lead to risk-loving behavior
when considering small gambles. We prove that given a gamble X with strictly negative
expectation, any risk-averse and expected utility decision maker will reject the gamble tX
for all t > 0 small enough, provided the background risk W is non-trivial. Thus, while
limited liability can in some cases make decision makers who are risk-averse appear to be
risk-loving, this phenomenon does not occur with small gambles.
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion. As is well known, under CARA expected utility
a decision maker accepts or rejects a gamble independently of wealth level, and thus also
independently of background risk. This apparent contradiction to our main results is ex-
plained by the fact that CARA rules out heavy-tailed distributions if we additionally require
expected utilities to be finite.9
Due to the fact that infinite expected utilities cannot be compared, there is no contra-
diction between the assumption that a CARA decision maker rejects a gamble X and our
conclusion that she finds it dominant to accept X under a heavy-tailed background risk W .
This technical issue notwithstanding, it is worth mentioning that heavy-tailed distributions
have a long history in modeling risk and have seen a number of economic applications (see,
e.g. Morris and Yildiz, 2019).
Choice Between Two Gambles. Large background risk leads to risk-neutral behavior
not only in the choice between accepting or rejecting a given small gamble, but also in the
choice between two small gambles X and Y . As we show in §D in the Appendix, given
two gambles X and Y with E [X ] > E [Y ], for any background risk W with sufficiently
heavy tails both on the left and on the right, the resulting distribution of X +W first-order
stochastically dominates that of Y +W .
9To be specific, consider a CARA decision maker with risk aversion level α, together with a gamble X
that she rejects without any background risk. Then the riskiness index satisfies R(X) ≥ 1/α. By Theorem
1, we can find a background risk W with size S(W ) ≥ R(X), such that W + X first-order stochastically
dominates W . Nonetheless, since S(W ) ≥ R(X) ≥ 1/α, it can be shown that the CARA expected utilities of
W and W +X are both −∞. For example, if W has Laplace distribution with density g(x) = β2 e−β|x|, then
S(W ) ≥ 1/α requires β ≤ α. Denoting by u(x) = −e−αx the CARA utility function, it is then easy to see
∫∞
−∞
u(x) · g(x) dx = −∞.
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Second-Order Stochastic Dominance. In §C in the Appendix, we consider decision
makers whose preferences are monotone with respect to second-order stochastic dominance.
This is a stronger assumption that is natural in the study of risk aversion. In this setting
we prove a result that is analogous to our main Theorem 1: every actuarially favorable
gamble is accepted when the left tail of the background risk is heavy enough. The measure
of tail-heaviness is different in this case, requiring less background risk than the first-order
stochastic dominance case.
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A Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose W is heavy left-tailed, i.e. it satisfies S(W ) > 0. As shown by
Aumann and Serrano (2008), the riskiness index R is positive homogeneous, i.e. it satisfies
R(tX) = tR(X) for all t > 0. Thus, the riskiness of tX is lower than the exponential size of
W for all t small enough. It then follows from Theorem 1 that accepting tX is dominant.
Now suppose the decision maker is protected by limited liability. We prove the following
analogue of Theorem 1, which will imply this part of Corollary 1 as well as Corollary 2.
Proposition 1. Suppose the decision maker is protected by limited liability bound ℓ. Then










Compared to the definition of S(W ), the supremum on the right-hand side above only
considers points above ℓ − max[X ]. We now show that Proposition 1 implies the limited
liability case of Corollary 1. Since we assumed g to be strictly positive and piece-wise con-
tinuously differentiable, the ratio g′(a)/g(a) is bounded on every compact interval. Moreover,
as g is eventually decreasing, this ratio is bounded for points a ≥ ℓ − 1. Thus, for t > 0














is bounded away from zero. Applying Proposition 1 to the gamble tX yields Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. We follow the proof of Theorem 1 in §4, and explain the necessary
modifications. Under limited liability, accepting the gamble X is dominant if
P [W +X ≤ a] ≤ P [W ≤ a] = G(a) for all a ≥ ℓ .
Thus, instead of (2), we only need to check












≤ 1. So the CARA decision maker with utility function U(a) = ea/s would
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reject the gamble −X .
On the other hand, the definition of s implies that the function G has weakly higher
Arrow-Pratt index than U on the interval [ℓ−max[X ],∞), so G is a concave transformation
of U on this interval. Since the comparison between a and a−X in (4) only involves wealth
levels that are above ℓ−max[X ], we deduce that rejection of −X by the utility function U
implies rejection by G. Hence the proposition.













2σ2 denotes the density of the normal background risk. It is well
















B On Limited Liability and Risk Aversion
In this section we consider an expected utility decision maker endowed with a utility function
u : R → R that is differentiable, strictly increasing, concave, and bounded from above. The
decision maker is protected by limited liability bound ℓ. We assume that the background
risk W satisfies P [W = ℓ] = 0 and P [W > ℓ] > 0 (these conditions are weaker than the
assumption described in §2). We have the following result:
Proposition 2. Let X be any bounded gamble with negative expectation. Then under the
above conditions, it holds that for all t > 0 small enough,
E [u((W + tX)ℓ)] < E [u(Wℓ)] .
Thus, it is optimal for the decision maker to reject any small gamble tX with negative
expectation. This result clarifies that for small gambles, limited liability does not lead to
risk-loving behavior (under general assumptions on preferences). The result has an additional
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implication. In the absence of limited liability, it is known that no background risk can make
it dominant to accept a gamble with negative expectation: a necessary condition for W +X
to dominate W in first-order stochastic dominance is that X has positive expectation.10 The
result here shows that the same conclusion holds under limited liability, for small gambles.
Proof of Proposition 2. Without loss of generality, we set the liability bound to be ℓ = 0. Let
W satisfy P [W = 0] = 0 and P [W > 0] > 0. Under our assumptions on u, the expectations
E [u((W + tX)+)] and E [u(W+)] are finite. Normalizing u(0) = 0, we can compute the
payoff difference between accepting and rejecting tX as follows:
E
[
u((W + tX)+)− u(W+)
]
= E [1W+tX>0 · u(W + tX)− 1W>0 · u(W )]
= E [1W>0 · [u(W + tX)− u(W )]] + E [[1W+tX>0 − 1W>0] · u(W + tX)]
≤ E [1W>0 · [u(W + tX)− u(W )]] + E [|1W+tX>0 − 1W>0| · |u(W + tX)|] .
By the concavity of u, we have
u(W + tX)− u(W ) ≤ u′(W ) · tX ,
where we interpret the derivative u′ as the left-derivative in this proof. Thus, we get that
E [1W>0 · [u(W + tX)− u(W )]] ≤ E [1W>0u′(W )tX ] = t · E [1W>0u′(W )] · E [X ] .
Using the assumption that W > 0 with positive probability, u′ > 0 (which follows from strict





E [1W>0 · [u(W + tX)− u(W )]] ≤ E [1W>0u′(W )] · E [X ] < 0 .
Next, suppose |X| ≤ L. Then 1W+tX>0 6= 1W>0 if and only if W + tX > 0 ≥ W or
W + tX ≤ 0 < W . In both cases we obtain |W | ≤ tL and |W + tX| ≤ tL. Thus
E [|1W+tX>0 − 1W>0| · |u(W + tX)|] ≤ P [|W | ≤ tL] · sup
|a|≤tL
|u(a)|.
10This is clear when W has finite expectation, since then E [X ] = E [W +X ] − E [W ] > 0. The general
case was shown by Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz (2020).
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E [|1W+tX>0 − 1W>0| · |u(W + tX)|] ≤ lim sup
t→0




|u(a)| = 0 ,




· −u(−tL) = L · u′(0) < ∞.







u((W + tX)+)− u(W+)
]
< 0.
Hence for sufficiently small t, the decision maker would reject the scaled gamble tX under
limited liability.
We conclude with two observations. We assumed that W takes values above ℓ with
positive probability. Clearly, if W ≤ ℓ with certainty, then it is dominant to accept every
gamble under limited liability. It is also important for the result that E [X ] is strictly
negative. If the gamble X has zero expectation, then it can be dominant to accept tX
for every small t, so long as the background risk distribution G is concave on the interval
(ℓ− ǫ,∞) for some positive ǫ (since this guarantees (4) for tX).
C Second-Order Dominance
Our analysis can be extended to the smaller class of risk-averse preferences. We say that
accepting X is dominant for a risk-averse decision maker if W + X dominates W with
respect to second-order stochastic dominance. We also introduce a modified version of the









It is easy to show that S2(W ) ≥ S(W ).11
11If S(W ) = 0 then the result is trivial. If instead S(W ) > 0, then we have the inequality g(x) ≥ g(y)·e
x−y
S(W ) .
Note that G(y) =
∫ y
−∞
g(x) dx → 0 as y → −∞. Using the previous inequality, we deduce that g(y) → 0 as


















Theorem 2. Under any given background risk W with finite expectation, it is dominant for
a risk-averse decision maker to accept every gamble X with positive expectation and riskiness
R(X) ≤ S2(W ).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let s = S2(W ) and without loss focus on s > 0. By a well-known




P [W +X ≤ t] dt ≤
∫ a
−∞
P [W ≤ t] dt for all a ∈ R. (5)
That the integrals in (5) are finite follows from the fact that W and W + X have finite
expectations. By Tonelli’s Theorem, the quantity
∫ a
−∞ P [W +X ≤ t] dt is equal to
∫ a
−∞













Hence, it is second-order dominant to accept a gamble X if and only if for every a ∈ R
E [uG(a−X)] ≤ uG(a),
where uG(a) =
∫ a
−∞G(t) dt. Therefore, as in the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain that accepting








≤ 1 =⇒ E [uG(a−X)] ≤ uG(a) for all a ∈ R. (6)
Equation (6) holds whenever uG is globally more risk-averse than the CARA utility function
U(a) = e
a
s . The Arrow-Pratt index for uG is −g(a)/G(a), which by assumption is weakly
larger than −1/s, the Arrow-Pratt index for U . Thus uG is indeed more risk-averse than U ,
concluding the proof.
D Choice Between Two Gambles
In this section, we extend the analysis to situations where the decision maker faces a choice
between two bounded gambles X and Y that have distinct distributions FX and FY . We
say it is dominant to choose X over Y under background risk W , if W + X first-order
stochastically dominates W + Y . A result similar to Theorem 1 can be obtained if we
consider background risks with heavy tails both on the left and on the right. For this we
As a result, S2(W ) ≥ S(W ) again holds.
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which is equal to min{S(W ), S(−W )}. Then we have:
Theorem 3. The following are equivalent:
(i) E[X ] > E[Y ];
(ii) there exists s ∈ (0,∞) such that under any background risk W with S∗(W ) ≥ s,
choosing X over Y is dominant.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first show (ii) implies (i). Given any finite s, we can choose W to
have a Laplace distribution with sufficiently large variance. Then W satisfies S∗(W ) ≥ s,
and by assumption W + X must first-order stochastically dominate W + Y . Since such a
W has finite expectation, we have E[W +X ] ≥ E[W + Y ], which implies E[X ] ≥ E[Y ]. The
inequality is in fact strict, for otherwise W +X would have the same distribution as W +Y ,
and X would have the same distribution as Y .12
To prove (i) implies (ii), we assume E[X ] > E[Y ] and take s to be a large positive number
(to be determined later). Consider any background risk W with S∗(W ) ≥ s, i.e. the density




for all a ∈ R.
We now use this to show P [W + Y ≤ a] ≥ P [W +X ≤ a] for all a. Since W is independent
from both X and Y , this comparison is equivalent to
∫ M
−M
g(a− z) · FY (z) dz ≥
∫ M
−M
g(a− z) · FX(z) dz,
where M is a large number such that [−M,M ] contains the support of both X and Y . This
in turn is equivalent to
∫ M
−M
eh(a−z) · (FY (z)− FX(z)) dz ≥ 0.
12The last claim can be proved by considering the moment generating function in a neighborhood of 0.
Since E[etW ] is finite for t close to 0, both E[et(W+X)] and E[et(W+Y )] are finite and are equal. It follows
that E[etX ] = E[etY ] for t in a neighborhood of 0, which implies X and Y have the same distribution.
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Dividing both sides by eh(a), we just need to show that for all a
∫ M
−M
eh(a−z)−h(a) · (FY (z)− FX(z)) dz ≥ 0.
Observe that since |h′| is bounded above by 1/s, we have |h(a − z) − h(a)| ≤ M/s for all
a ∈ R and all z ∈ [−M,M ]. Thus if s is chosen to be sufficiently large, then the above
integral converges, uniformly across a, to the integral
∫M
−M(FY (z) − FX(z)) dz. Since this
limit integral evaluates to E[X ]− E[Y ] > 0, the result follows.
If we only know that the background risk has a heavy left tail (as in Theorem 1), then
the condition E [X ] > E [Y ] is no longer sufficient to guarantee the dominance of X . Below
we derive the suitable condition in this case. We say that X strongly dominates Y in the
convex order, if max[X ] > max[Y ] and
∫ ∞
a
(FY (z)− FX(z)) dz > 0 for all a < max[X ]. (7)
In particular, this requires E [X ] > E [Y ] in the limit a → −∞.
To interpret this condition, note that X dominates Y in the convex order if and only if
−Y dominates −X in second-order stochastic dominance. In other terms, X can be obtained
from Y by a combination of mean-preserving spreads and right-ward mass shifts. Conversely,
if X is obtained from Y by replacing each realization y of Y by a gamble with expectation
strictly greater than y, then X strongly dominates Y in the convex order. This is a natural
generalization of the case studied in the main text, where Y is a constant and X is any
gamble with a higher expectation.
Theorem 4. Suppose max[X ] 6= max[Y ]. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) X strongly dominates Y in the convex order;
(ii) there exists s ∈ (0,∞) such that under any background risk W with S(W ) ≥ s, choosing
X over Y is dominant.
Proof of Theorem 4. As in the proof of Theorem 1, choosing X over Y is dominant if and
only if
E[G(a−X)] ≤ E[G(a− Y )] for all a ∈ R .
Since we want this to hold for all background risks G with exponential size ≥ s, and since
the exponential size is translation-invariant, it is without loss to restrict to the case of a = 0.
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That is, we seek to understand the conditions under which
E[G(−X)] ≤ E[G(−Y )] for all G with exponential size ≥ s.
As before, let U(a) = e
a
s denote a risk-loving CARA utility function. Then G has exponential
size at least s if and only if G(a) = φ(U(a)) for some increasing concave function φ.13 Thus,

















for all increasing concave functions φ.
In other terms, the random variable Ỹ = e
−Y
s should dominate X̃ = e
−X
s with respect to
second-order stochastic dominance.
Let F̃X and F̃Y denote the c.d.f. of X̃ and Ỹ , respectively. Then second-order stochastic
dominance holds if and only if (noting that X̃ and Ỹ are both supported on R+):
∫ c
0
(F̃X(t)− F̃Y (t)) dt ≥ 0 for all c > 0.
If we write t = e−
z
s , then F̃X(t) = 1 − FX(z), F̃Y (t) = 1 − FY (z). Changing variables in
the above integral, and denoting a = −s ln(c), we obtain the following equivalent condition
(modulo a factor of 1/s):
∫ ∞
a
(FY (z)− FX(z)) · e−
z
s dz ≥ 0 for all a ∈ R. (8)
Below we show that when the maxima of X and Y are different, the above condition holds
for some positive s if and only if X strongly dominates Y in the convex order.
In one direction, suppose max[X ] > max[Y ] and (7) holds. Then intuitively (8) would also
hold if s is large, in which case the integrand (FY (z)−FX(z)) · e−
z
s is close to FY (z)−FX(z).
This can be formalized by observing that we only need to prove (8) for a in the compact









(FY (z)−FX(z)) dz on this interval. Since this limit is a continuous function
in a and strictly positive on this interval, it is bounded away from 0. Thus by uniform
convergence, there exists some large s such that (8) holds.
13To be fully rigorous, we also need g(a) = φ′(ea/s)· 1sea/s to be strictly positive, continuously differentiable,
and eventually decreasing. These additional restrictions on φ do not affect the subsequent analysis because on
any compact domain, any increasing concave function can be uniformly approximated by another increasing
concave function with these additional properties.
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For the converse, suppose (8) holds for some s. Then there cannot exist some a with
FY (a) < 1 = FX(a), since otherwise (8) fails at this point a. It follows that max[X ] ≥
max[Y ], and the inequality is in fact strict by the assumption that max[X ] 6= max[Y ]. As
a result, FY (z) − FX(z) is strictly positive for z ∈ [max[Y ], max[X ]), and (8) holds with
strict inequality for a in the same interval. We now use this to prove (7). Observe that
∫ ∞
a
























So from (8), we must have
∫∞
a
(FY (z) − FX(z)) dz ≥ 0. Moreover, the inequality is strict
because in the double integral on the RHS above, the term
∫∞
c
(FY (z) − FX(z)) · e−
z
s dz is
strictly positive for any c ∈ [max[Y ], max[X ]). For any a < max[X ], the mass of such c > a
is strictly positive. Hence (7) holds with strict inequality, completing the proof.
E Additional Results
Proposition 3. For any gamble X that is supported on [−M,M ] and has expectation ǫ > 0,
its riskiness index satisfies R(X) ≤ M2
ǫ
.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let λ = ǫ
M2
. We first show that E[e−λX ] ≤ 1. Indeed, since ǫ = E[X ] ≤
M , we have λ ≤ 1
M
. As X ∈ [−M,M ] with probability one, we have −λX ∈ [−1, 1]. In this
range, it always holds that
e−λX ≤ 1− λX + (λX)2.
Hence E[e−λX ] ≤ 1− λE[X ] + λ2E[X2] ≤ 1− λǫ+ λ2M2 = 1.
Now, consider the function f(a) = E[e−aX ], defined for a ≥ 0. It is easy to see that
f(0) = 0 and f is strictly convex. Thus, 1
R(X)
is the unique number c > 0 such that f(c) = 0.





we desire to show.
Proposition 4. Let Y and Z be independent random variables. Suppose Z is distributed
according to a strictly positive and differentiable density g : R → R+ that is heavy left-tailed.
Suppose in addition that |g′| is bounded. Then, for every ǫ > 0, the random variable Y + ǫZ
is heavy left-tailed.


























From the above two equations, we see that if g′(a) ≤ s · g(a) for some s > 0 and all a ∈ R,
then f ′(a) ≤ s
ǫ
· f(a) also holds. Hence Y + ǫZ is heavy left-tailed whenever Z is.
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